Epistemology, I will argue, is of crucial importance to the sociology of knowledge&mdash; not just by way of definition of the phenomenon under study, but also because approaches to the sociology of knowledge rely on too-often implicit epistemological stances. I will make this argument through a series of categorizations: first, I will classify the field of epistemology into its three main forms; second, I will classify the sociology of knowledge into epistemological categories; third, I will classify the sociology of science into these same categories. All the while, I will be making an argument for an empirical epistemology and "agnostic" studies of knowledge. This article does not cover the field of epistemology exhaustively, but tries to offer an orderly overview of classic positions for the benefit of social scientists.
MONISM: JUSTIFICATION BY SUFFICIENCY
The chief emphasis in monist epistemologies is the justifiability of knowledge's truth-content. This goal is achieved through two types of arguments, the specific and the general (a listing of monist approaches follows this section). The specific monist points to a particular item of knowledge that is unquestionable, thereby showing that knowledge exists. The general monist gives a set of guidelines to justify knowledge in general.
G. E. Moore is the most famous of the first sort of monist. In a celebrated oration, Moore (1959) lifted his hands, gestured to them, and thereby proved that his hands existed (pp. 145-6) . However, since Moore's hands may no longer exist and since he cast doubt on their existence even during his lifetime (pp. 53-8) , when he argued that the perception of part of the surface of his hands did not justify the analysis, &dquo;This is a human hand,&dquo; I will consider another of Moore's examples. This is the proposition that &dquo;The earth has existed for many years past&dquo; (p. 36). Not only does Moore say he knows this &dquo;with certainty,&dquo; but he also knows that many other people know this too (pp. 32-4) . The (1) it is true, (2) we believe it, (3) it leads to no conclusions which experience confutes, (4) (Chisholm 1982,25; Campbell 1868, 104) . For example, sense-perceptions that are made in clear weather, at a decent range, and in sound mind are &dquo;epistemically in the clear&dquo; (Chisholm 1982, 24) (1980, 158) adopts this sort of approach (pp. 219-30 ). Yet, as Lakatos (1976b) has shown for mathematics and Carroll (1936) has shown for logic, these fields are far from self-justifying. Neither mathematical proofs nor logical syllogisms are clear-cut and true-for-all-time. Instead, they are a matter of persuasion, just like any other sort of argument, and their truth is dependent on the context and the accepted standards of sufficiency (see Bames and Bloor 1982, 40ff.).
Nonfoundationalist general monism is more interesting. It splits into two approaches. The first argues that knowledge is justified by its coherence: &dquo;The truth of a judgment is to be tested by its capacity for harmonising with all the other judgments we make about reality&dquo; (Campbell 1868, 97) . A proposition that fits with all the other propositions we believe to be true must itself be true, because if it is not, it would contradict some large portion of our beliefs. More precisely, it would be inconceivable (Johnson 1978, 245) or nonsensical (Grayling 1985) for the proposition not to be true. It is not merely that the statement &dquo;The earth has not existed for many years past&dquo; would contradict much of our system of knowledge, but that our system of knowledge renders such a statement incomprehensible. In other words, the system guarantees the truth of individual statements.
There are two problems with such a justification of knowledge. It is not at all clear that our beliefs form a coherent system in the first place. Quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity, for instance, are incompatible, and yet we accept them both as true (Rescher 1980, 243-4 (Grayling 1985, 54 (Gellner 1974, 13) . According to this line of reasoning, it is simply human nature to explain experience through conceptual schemes (Gellner 1974 , following Kant), or to generate hypotheses which will come to form conceptual schemes (Popper 1962, 46 (Rescher 1980, 230) And even if the environment or efficiency determined the truth of certain propositions (the truth-factor of knowledge), the practicalsuccess argument makes a further problematic claim that we are thereby required to believe that such propositions are true (the commitment-factor). In other words, it presumes that to act on a belief one must believe it to be true. This is the argument from necessity, which is typical of pluralism and will therefore be considered in the following section. On other matters assent is common practice. We may not believe the meteorologist's forecast of rain, but we carry our umbrellas just in case. We don't think rabbit's feet and astrological horoscopes really help us, but we consult them all the same.
People both act on &dquo;commonsense notions&dquo;, and are at the same time aware that these &dquo;commonsense notions&dquo; are cognitively inadequate and second rate. This is reflected in a number of well-known characteristics of modem life: the invocation of the expert when important decisions are taken, the expectation that the expert's language shall be specialised and unintelligible. (Gellner 1968, 428) Agnosticism may escape this contradiction in one of two ways. The first, which I have never seen spelled out but which strikes me as possible, is to make a special exception for agnosticism: no knowledge is justified except for the agnostic position. In other words, one could be openly dogmatic about agnosticism.
The more common agnostic defense is to refuse to make a knowledge-claim about the unjustifiability of knowledge. For example, &dquo;the contention is that no one knows anything, not even that no one knows anything&dquo; (Lehrer 1978, 347 (Bunge 1983, 85 (1968, 134) . This is a shame. As it now stands, agnosticism is a walled city with no buildings inside-well-defended but not particularly well-developed. I am in no position to attempt such a development here, but I would like to give an outline of the shape I think it might take.
As I see it, there are four factors in the acceptance of any particular item of knowledge: its relation to &dquo;the real world,&dquo; its novelty, its social and theoretical context, and its phrasing. These are probably interrelated in complex ways, but they all seem to me to be important. Each of these factors has been championed by a major philosopher of science: empirical testing by Popper (1962) , novelty by Lakatos (1978) , the social-theoretical context by Kuhn (1970) , and rhetoric by Feyerabend (1978, Berger and Luckmann (1967) write, &dquo;We therefore exclude from the sociology of knowledge the epistemological and methodological problems that bothered both of its major originators [Mannheim and Scheler]&dquo; (p. 14). And where a connection is allowed, it generally treats the sociology of knowledge as mere evidence with which to construct theories of knowledge (for example, Mannheim 1936, 294; Mills 1963, chap. 4 Pluralists are distinguishable by their critique of monism: Different people claim to know the world differently, and no one way of knowing the world is more justified than any other way Pluralists then go on to attribute different systems of knowledge to particular social groups, with the justification from necessity articulated-not always explicitly-in terms of social compulsion. For instance, in Douglas (1966) , one simply cannot violate one's social system's ideas of purity and pollution: There is &dquo;a power inhering in the structure of ideas, a power by which the structure is expected to protect itself&dquo; (p. 113). Pluralists disagree as to the social group to which such systems of knowledge are attributed.
Agnostics are distinguishable by their critique of both monism and pluralism. Their anti-monism is shared with the pluralists: Different people claim to know the world differently, and no one way of knowing the world is more justified than any other way But agnostics do not accept the pluralist solution that knowledge is justified by its compulsory acceptance within each social group. They note the multiplicity of systems of knowledge within each social group (Foucault 1972, 158-9; Bames 1977, 57-8) or the internal contradictions of each system of knowledge (Bloor 1976,117; Hesse 1980,44) (Marx and Engels 1978) . Social forces: Some social groups are subject to social forces that allow them to obtain true knowledge, while other social groups are subject to inhibiting social forces (Merton 1973) . Evolution: Knowledge increases through time, either by accumulation (Elias 1971) or by progressive adaptation (Durkheim 1933 (Bourdieu 1971; Bourdieu and Saint Martin 1975 (Daniels 1975) (Chodorow 1978; Gilligan 1982) . Societies: Each culture (Geertz 1973) , social system (Douglas 1966) , or linguistic vocabulary (Mills 1963) (Mannheim 1936 (Bloor 1976) . Power: Relations of power both constitute and are constituted by discourse, which in turn defines knowledge (Foucault}) . Socialization: Children are taught and persuaded to accept society's definition of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann 1967) .
EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE
The sociology of knowledge thus described draws the lines for its main sub-field and empirical application, the sociology of science. Some practitioners in this area would deny that the sociology of science ought to be concerned with knowledge (e.g., Ben-David 1971) (Hessen 1931 ).
Social forces: Some scientists are subject to social forces that allow them to obtain true knowledge (Merton, 1973; Ben-David, 1971 (Daniels 1975) or because of their differing responses to science's self-image as a male observer of a female reality (Keller 1985) . Social groups: Each thought collective (Fleck, 1935) or scientific paradigm (Kuhn, 1970) (Mannheim 1936) .
. Those who study pluralism by class, since reflection on the dominant class' influence on science will allow some escape from that influence (Bourdieu} 1975 (Bourdieu} ,1984 Gouldner 1973 Rhetorical strategies (Feyerabend 1978; Lamont 1987 ; and other authors in the field of rhetoric of science).
Recognized experts exert their authority (Fleck2 1935). New, creative approaches (Bames 1974, 84ff.) . Power struggles between experts (Mulkay 1979 and other authors in the field of sociology of scientific knowledge-see Collins 1983 ).
Let us examine Kuhn and Fleck in a little more detail. Kuhn (1970) argues that the scientific paradigm limits and justifies the knowledge created by individual scientists working within the paradigm. This is a straightforward pluralism. However, Kuhn also adopts-throughout the book but particularly explicitly in his conclusion-a monist position. Science Barnes and Bloor (1982, 25) and for applying the word "agnosticism" where others have used "skepticism," "relativism," and so forth.
2. For examples, see Gellner (1974,1) on monism; Geertz (1984,263) on pluralism; and Barnes and Bloor (1982, 21) on agnosticism.
3. See Adorno (1983, 6-7) and James (1979, 20-4) attacking monism; Gellner (1974, 49) attacking pluralism; Ayer (1958, 253) and Rescher (1980, e.g., 46) attacking agnosticism.
